# CRYPTANALYSIS OF RSA USING THE RATIO OF THE PRIMES

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Tunis, June 24, 2009

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Basics on RSA Former attacks on RSA

## **Colour conventions**

#### Red

Secret parameters.

Blue or Black

Public parameters.

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#### **RSA cryptosystem**

- Invented by Rivest, Shamir and Adleman in 1977.
- The world's successful public key encryption algorithm.
- The security of RSA is based on the problem of factoring large integers: Given N = pq, find p and q.
- *p* and *q* are large primes (at least 512 bits).

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Basics on RSA Former attacks on RSA

#### The RSA modulus

- *p*, *q* large primes of equal bitsize.
- N = pq is the RSA modulus.

#### The public and private exponents

- $\phi(N) = (p-1)(q-1)$ , the Euler totient function.
- *e* ∈ N, with 1 < *e* < φ(N), and gcd(*e*, φ(N)) = 1, the public exponent.
- $ed \equiv 1 \pmod{\phi(N)}$ .
- $d \in \mathbb{N}$ ,  $1 < d < \phi(N)$ , the private exponent.

#### The RSA equation

$$ed - (p-1)(q-1)k = 1.$$

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## Wiener

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#### Wiener, 1990

If  $d < \frac{1}{3}N^{\frac{1}{4}}$  then  $\frac{k}{d}$  is among the convergents of the continued fraction expansion of  $\frac{e}{N}$  and the factorization of N = pq can be found.

#### The method

•  $\frac{k}{d} \approx \frac{e}{N}$ . • The continued fraction algorithm

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- $k(N+1-x) \equiv 1 \pmod{e}$ , where x = p + q.
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#### Boneh-Durfee, 2000

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#### The method

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# **Blömer-May**

### Using a variant of the RSA equation

$$ex - (p-1)(q-1)k = y.$$

### Blömer-May, 2004

If 
$$x < \frac{1}{3}N^{\frac{1}{4}}$$
 and  $|y| = O\left(N^{-\frac{3}{4}}ex\right)$  then the factorization of  $N = pq$  can be found.

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### Using a variant of the RSA equation

$$eX - (p - u)(q - v)Y = 1.$$

u = v = 1 implies the RSA equation ed - (p-1)(q-1)k = 1.

#### Nitaj, 2008

If  $1 \le Y < X < 2^{-\frac{1}{4}}N^{\frac{1}{4}}$ ,  $|u| < N^{\frac{1}{4}}$ ,  $v = \left[-\frac{qu}{p-u}\right]$ , and all prime factors of p - u or q - v are less than  $10^{50}$ , then the factorization of N = pq can be found.

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Overview Tools The new attacks

## The new attacks

The variant RSA equation

eX - (N - (ap + bq))Y = Z, where  $\frac{a}{b}$  is a convergent of  $\frac{q}{p}$ 

If a = b = 1, then eX - (p - 1)(q - 1)Y = Z - Y (Blömer-May).

#### The attacks

- Small Difference  $|ap bq| < (abN)^{\frac{1}{4}}$
- 2 Medium Difference  $(abN)^{rac{1}{4}} < |ap-bq| < aN^{rac{1}{4}}$
- 3 Large Difference  $aN^{rac{1}{4}} < |ap-bq|$

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Overview Tools The new attacks

## **Continued fractions**

#### The Continued fraction alorithm

• *e* and *N* are coprime positive integers.

• 
$$\frac{e}{N} = a_0 + \frac{1}{a_1 + \frac{1}{a_2 + \frac{1}{a_3 + \cdots}}}$$
.

- $\frac{c}{N} = [a_0, a_1, a_2, \cdots]$  where  $a_i$  are positive integers.
- $\frac{r_i}{s_i} = [a_0, a_1, a_2, \cdots, a_i]$  are called the convergents.

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Overview Tools The new attacks

## **Continued fractions**

#### Theorem

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If \frac{a}{b} is a convergent of x, then
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$$\left|x-\frac{a}{b}\right|<\frac{1}{b^2}.$$

#### Theorem

lf

$$\left|x-\frac{a}{b}\right| < \frac{1}{2b^2},$$

then  $\frac{a}{b}$  is one of the convergents of the continued fraction expansion of x.

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## Coppersmith's method

#### **Coppermith's Theorem**

Let N = pq be an RSA modulus with  $q . Given an approximation <math>\tilde{p}$  of p with  $|p - \tilde{p}| < N^{\frac{1}{4}}$ , then N = pq can be factored in time polynomial in  $\log N$ .

#### Coppermith's Theorem

Lattices

Lenstra-Lenstra-Lovasz (LLL) algorithm

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- Lattices
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## **ECM**

### **Smooth numbers**

Let *y* be a positive constant. A positive number *n* is *y*-smooth if all prime factors of *n* are less than *y*.

### The Elliptic Curve Method (ECM)

- H.W. Lenstra, 1985, phase 1.
- Brent, Montgomery, 1986-87, phase 2.
- ECM is very efficient to factor Becm-smooth integers where

 $B_{\rm ecm} = 10^{52}$ 

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RSA and Wiener Over The new attacks Conclusion The

Overview Tools The new attacks

# The first attack

### The variant RSA equation

$$eX - (N - (ap + bq))Y = Z.$$

### The first attack: Small Difference |ap - bq|

• Let  $\frac{a}{b}$  be an unknown convergent of the continued fraction expansion of  $\frac{q}{p}$  with  $a \ge 1$  and  $|ap - bq| < (abN)^{\frac{1}{4}}$ .

• Set 
$$ap + bq = N^{\frac{1}{2} + \alpha}$$
 with  $0 < \alpha < \frac{1}{2}$ .

• If

• 
$$1 \le Y \le X < \frac{1}{2}N^{\frac{1}{4} - \frac{\alpha}{2}}$$

•  $|Z| < \inf\left((abN)^{\frac{1}{4}}, \frac{1}{2}N^{\frac{1}{2}-\alpha}\right)Y,$ 

then N can be factored in polynomial time.

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# The first attack

### The variant RSA equation

$$eX - (N - (ap + bq))Y = Z.$$

### The first attack: Small Difference |ap - bq|

• Let  $\frac{a}{b}$  be an unknown convergent of the continued fraction expansion of  $\frac{q}{p}$  with  $a \ge 1$  and  $|ap - bq| < (abN)^{\frac{1}{4}}$ .

• Set 
$$ap + bq = N^{\frac{1}{2} + \alpha}$$
 with  $0 < \alpha < \frac{1}{2}$ .

If

• 
$$1 \leq Y \leq X < \frac{1}{2}N^{\frac{1}{4}-\frac{\alpha}{2}}$$

• 
$$|\mathbf{Z}| < \inf\left((abN)^{\frac{1}{4}}, \frac{1}{2}N^{\frac{1}{2}-\alpha}\right)\mathbf{Y},$$

then N can be factored in polynomial time.

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## The second attack

### The variant RSA equation

$$eX - (N - (ap + bq))Y = Z.$$

The second attack: Medium Difference |ap - bq|

- Let <sup>a</sup>/<sub>b</sub> be an unknown convergent of the continued fraction expansion of <sup>q</sup>/<sub>p</sub> such that
  - $a \ge 1, b \le 10^{52}$
  - $(abN)^{\frac{1}{4}} < |ap bq| < aN^{\frac{1}{4}}$
- Set  $M = N \frac{eX}{Y}$  and  $ap + bq = N^{\frac{1}{2} + \alpha}$  with  $0 < \alpha < \frac{1}{2}$ . • If
  - $1 \le Y \le X < \frac{1}{2}N^{\frac{1}{4} \frac{\alpha}{2}}$
  - and  $|Z| < \min\left(aN^{\frac{1}{4}}, \frac{1}{2}N^{\frac{1}{2}-\alpha}\right)Y$ ,

then, under ECM, N can be factored efficiently.

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## The second attack

The variant RSA equation

$$eX - (N - (ap + bq))Y = Z.$$

The second attack: Medium Difference |ap - bq|

 Let <sup>a</sup>/<sub>b</sub> be an unknown convergent of the continued fraction expansion of <sup>q</sup>/<sub>p</sub> such that

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• Set  $M = N - \frac{eX}{Y}$  and  $ap + bq = N^{\frac{1}{2} + \alpha}$  with  $0 < \alpha < \frac{1}{2}$ .

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• 
$$1 \leq Y \leq X < \frac{1}{2}N^{\frac{1}{4}-\frac{\alpha}{2}}$$

• and 
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then, under ECM, N can be factored efficiently.

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## The third attack

### The variant RSA equation

$$eX - (N - (ap + bq))Y = Z.$$

### The third attack: Large Difference |ap - bq|

• Let  $\frac{a}{b}$  be an unknown convergent of the continued fraction expansion of  $\frac{q}{b}$  such that  $a \ge 1$  and  $b \le 10^{52}$ .

• Set 
$$M = N - \frac{eX}{Y}$$
,  $D = \sqrt{|M^2 - 4abN|}$ 

• 
$$ap + bq = N^{\frac{1}{2} + \alpha}$$
 with  $0 < \alpha < \frac{1}{2}$ .

• If

• 
$$1 \leq Y \leq X < \frac{1}{2}N^{\frac{1}{4} - \frac{\alpha}{2}}$$

• and 
$$|Z| < \frac{1}{3}a|ap - bq|N^{-\frac{1}{4}-\alpha}Y$$

then, under ECM, N can be factored efficiently.

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# The third attack

### The variant RSA equation

$$eX - (N - (ap + bq))Y = Z.$$

### The third attack: Large Difference |ap - bq|

• Let  $\frac{a}{b}$  be an unknown convergent of the continued fraction expansion of  $\frac{q}{b}$  such that  $a \ge 1$  and  $b \le 10^{52}$ .

• Set 
$$M = N - \frac{eX}{Y}$$
,  $D = \sqrt{|M^2 - 4abN|}$ 

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$$ap + bq = N^{\frac{1}{2} + \alpha}$$
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If

• 
$$1 \leq Y \leq X < \frac{1}{2}N^{\frac{1}{4}-\frac{\alpha}{2}}$$

• and 
$$|Z| < \frac{1}{3}a|ap - bq|N^{-\frac{1}{4}-\alpha}Y$$

then, under ECM, N can be factored efficiently.

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# The proofs in brief

Using the equation eX - (N - (ap + bq))Y = Z.

- Write eX NY = Z (ap + bq)Y. Then, if X, Y and Z are "small", we get  $\frac{Y}{Y} \approx \frac{e}{N}.$
- Compute X, Y from the continued fraction expansion of  $\frac{e}{N}$ .
- Hence  $ap + bq = N \frac{eX}{Y} + \frac{Z}{Y}$  and if  $\frac{|Z|}{Y}$  is "small", then  $ap + bq \approx N - \frac{eX}{Y}$  and  $ab = \left[\frac{\left(N - \frac{eX}{Y}\right)^2}{4N}\right].$

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# The proofs in brief

Using the equation eX - (N - (ap + bq))Y = Z.

- Write eX NY = Z (ap + bq)Y. Then, if X, Y and Z are "small", we get
- Compute *X*, *Y* from the continued fraction expansion of  $\frac{e}{N}$ .

 $\frac{\mathbf{r}}{\mathbf{v}} \approx \frac{\mathbf{e}}{\mathbf{N}}.$ 

• Hence  $ap + bq = N - \frac{eX}{Y} + \frac{Z}{Y}$  and if  $\frac{|Z|}{Y}$  is "small", then  $ap + bq \approx N - \frac{eX}{Y}$  and  $ab = \left[\frac{\left(N - \frac{eX}{Y}\right)^2}{4N}\right].$  RSA and Wiener Overview The new attacks Tools Conclusion The new attacks

# The proofs in brief

Using the equation eX - (N - (ap + bq))Y = Z.

- Write eX NY = Z (ap + bq)Y. Then, if X, Y and Z are "small", we get  $\frac{Y}{Y} \approx \frac{e}{N}$ .
- Compute *X*, *Y* from the continued fraction expansion of  $\frac{e}{N}$ .
- Hence  $ap + bq = N \frac{eX}{Y} + \frac{Z}{Y}$  and if  $\frac{|Z|}{Y}$  is "small", then  $ap + bq \approx N - \frac{eX}{Y}$  and  $ab = \left[\frac{\left(N - \frac{eX}{Y}\right)^2}{4N}\right].$

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#### The first attack

If |ap - bq| is "small", then

$$\left.\frac{ap}{2}-\frac{N-\frac{eX}{Y}}{2}\right|\leq (abN)^{\frac{1}{4}}.$$

Hence  $ap \approx \frac{N - \frac{eX}{Y}}{2}$  and applying Copersmith's theorem, we find ap and finally p = gcd(ap, N).

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#### The second attack

If |ap - bq| is "medium" and  $b < 10^{52}$ , then

• Apply ECM to find *a*, *b* with a < b < 2a using  $ab = \left[\frac{\left(N - \frac{eX}{Y}\right)^2}{4N}\right].$ 

Hence

$$\left| p - \frac{N - \frac{eX}{Y}}{2a} \right| \le N^{\frac{1}{4}}.$$

Hence  $p \approx \frac{N - \frac{eX}{Y}}{2a}$  and applying Copersmith's theorem, we find p.

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#### The third attack

If |ap - bq| is "large" and  $b < 10^{52}$ , then

- Apply ECM to find *a*, *b* with a < b < 2a using  $ab = \left[\frac{\left(N \frac{eX}{Y}\right)^2}{4N}\right].$
- Compute  $D = \sqrt{|M^2 4abN|}$ .

Hence

$$\left| \frac{p - \frac{D + N - \frac{eX}{Y}}{2a}}{2a} \right| \le N^{\frac{1}{4}}.$$

Hence  $p \approx \frac{D+N-\frac{eX}{Y}}{2a}$  and applying Copersmith's theorem, we find p.

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Cardinality Thanks

#### Cardinality

- eX (N (ap + bq))Y = Z.
- The parameters *X*, *Y*, *Z* are "small".
- $\frac{a}{b}$  is a convergente of  $\frac{q}{p}$ .
- Then using the continued fraction algoritm, ECM and Cppersmit's method, we can find the factorization of N = pq.
- The number of such week keys is at least  $N^{\frac{3}{4}-\varepsilon}$ .

Cardinality Thanks

### Thank you for your attention

Merci



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